The recent development of payment channels and their extensions (e.g., state channels) provides a promising scalability solution for blockchains which allows untrusting parties to transact off-chain and resolve potential disputes via on-chain smart contracts. To protect participants who have no constant access to the blockchain, a watching service named as watchtower is proposed -a third-party entity obligated to monitor channel states (on behalf of the participants) and correct them on-chain if necessary. Unfortunately, currently proposed watchtower schemes suffer from multiple security and efficiency drawbacks.
INTRODUCTION
Scalability is seen as the main limitation of currently deployed permissionless blockchain systems [10] . Mainstream platforms like Bitcoin or Ethereum can handle from a few to several transactions per second, and clearly, without handling high transaction volumes these systems are unlikely to achieve mass adoption. While more performant consensus algorithms are being constantly proposed (i.e., layer-1 solutions) [8, 18, 25, 33, 34] , the concept of payment channels has emerged in parallel. Payment channels and network build upon them, like Lightning Network [35] or Raiden [4] , are layer-2 solutions which involve on-chain smart contracts only for channel management (i.e., creation, termination, or dispute) while all regular transactions are exchanged off-chain. That allows untrusting parties to transact off-chain as simple and fast as exchanging signed messages which is especially important for micropayments.
A party can close a channel by sending the latest statement to the smart contract, which verifies whether the statement is properly signed by both parties and transfers the tokens accordingly. The smart contract does not know what is the off-chain state, thus the payout operation is timeouted to give another party time to dispute. Disputes are resolved by the contract itself, simply accepting the freshest message (e.g., messages can be ordered by unique ascending counters). One security assumption in this setting is that a party has to be online to detect and prevent misbehavior of its peer sending a stale message to close the channel.
To relax the always online assumption, the concept of outsourcing arbitration to so-called watchtowers (or monitors) was proposed [2] . They are highly available third parties which are contacted by transacting parties with every transaction. Therefore, an involved watchtower knows the current off-chain payment state and its duty is to monitor the on-chain state. In the case of a misbehavior, i.e., when a party tries to close the channel using a stale state, the watchtower will be able to trigger the dispute process by providing the current state on behalf of the inactive party.
Unfortunately, watchtower schemes present in the literature have some important limitations (see details in Section 2). They need to observe every channel contract separately, and they are not fail-safe, allowing misbehavior under their unavailability, or still requiring a significant payout timeout. 1 To mitigate these drawbacks we propose a concept of fail-safe watchtowers. In our construction, watchtowers do not watch channel contracts constantly anymore. Instead, they observe and assert off-chain transactions, and periodically send a message to the blockchain, encoding the latest states of watched payment channels. A party closing its channel has to authorize this operation by confirming its state with the fresh information submitted by the watchtower. Sending a "positive" information can eliminate long timeouts present in current systems where watchtowers send only "negative" information (correcting an incorrect state). Moreover, our design of watchtowers incentivizes them to confirm (or reject) a given state as soon as possible. This construction allows to implement quick channel termination in the common case (i.e., when the watchtower is online), is fail-safe as a longer timeout will be triggered only when the watchtower is offline, and allows watchtowers to scale better as they can be implemented as light blockchain clients. Furthermore, we show that for a large number of payment channels, watchtower schemes in general may be economically ineffective. To improve security in these cases we introduce short-lived assertions, that allow channel contracts to distinguish fresh and stale assertions and process them accordingly (minimizing timeouts and misbehavior impact).
In this work we make the following contributions:
(1) we propose a novel construction of watchtowers, which in contrast to prior proposals, minimize payout delays in the common case (i.e., when the parties are honest), are fail-safe, efficient, and privacy-preserving (see Section 4), (2) we show the economic limitations of watchtower schemes and introduce novel short-lived assertions for payment channels, which is a complementary solution suitable for multiple scenarios, like micropayments (see Section 7) , (3) we implement and evaluate the proposed systems to demonstrate their security, feasibility, and efficiency (see Section 5) .
MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORK
Payment Channels. Currently existing decentralized permissionless blockchain platforms (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum) can hardly compete against those centralized financial service providers like VISA or Paypal in terms of processed transactions per second (TPS). To put this into perspective, Bitcoin only supports up to 7 TPS [10] , while VISA can handle an average of 150 million transactions every day or around 1736 TPS [6] . Today, the scalability problem of such blockchains has been regarded as a main obstacle for their further adoption as large scale payment networks.
The community has put forth various proposals to increase the throughput of blockchain platforms. Reparameterization of block sizes and block intervals of existing systems has been proved to be ineffective [17] in boosting the performance. Designing new consensus protocols from scratch [16, 27] is promising, but requires significant implementation, deployment, and adoption costs to be used in practice. Moreover, it takes a long time to understand and build up the security confidence of new consensus protocols.
Another line of research is to minimize the interactions with blockchains by using off-chain protocols -the so-called layer-2 solutions. Recently developed payment channels and state channels together with their extensions [9, 19, 28] belong to this approach. The main idea of layer-2 solutions is to make payments and state transitions by exchanging off-chain messages among small groups of parties privately, and use the blockchain as a backstop only when disputes arise. As a result, parties can make a huge number of offchain transactions, while only their initial deposit and the finalized balances will be included on-chain. Moreover, this approach is backward compatible with existing systems and is orthogonal to other scalability solutions, thus it has become a promising approach for improving the scalability of blockchains and cryptocurrencies.
The layer-2 payment protocols have evolved from simplex and probabilistic payment channels [13, 21, 22, 32] to fully duplex payment channels [12, 14, 19, 26] , based on which payment networks [4, 24, 30, 35] can be constructed where users can send payment to each other without establishing a direct channel from scratch. Besides, state channels [15] generalize the concept of payment channels to support not only payments but also the execution of arbitrary state transitions. We refer the readers to [20, 23] for a more comprehensive discussion of the layer-2 off-chain protocols. In this work, we mainly focus on enhancing the security of payment channels, although our schemes can be generalized to state channels.
Watching Service. The dispute resolution mechanisms of payment channels require that the parties are online and synchronized with the blockchain to prevent the channels from finalizing with invalid stale states. To alleviate this strong always-online requirement, schemes outsourcing the responsibility of monitoring the blockchains and issuing challenges in case of disputes to third-party watching services are proposed. Users outsource their latest offchain states to the watching service before parting offline. Watching services then act on behalf of the users to protect their funds. Users can still verify the correct behavior of watching services and punish them in case of ineligibility and non-compliance [20] .
Monitor [2] is a watching service for the Lightning network. However, due to the nature of replace-by-revocation channels in the Lightning network, the Monitor has to store all transactions within the channel, making it inefficient to provide service to a large number of busy channels simultaneously. The WatchTower scheme proposed by Osuntokun [31] reduces the storage requirement of Monitor from O(N ) to O (1) . But this improvement relies on a new opcode to parse and verify a signed message, which is currently unavailable in Bitcoin. Therefore, WatchTower cannot take the place of Monitor without updating the underlying layer-1 protocol. More importantly, both Monitor and WatchTower lack a mechanism for customers to recourse when the watching service fails to settle a dispute, since no verifiable evidence is provided.
To address the inefficiencies and limitations of prior watching services, PISA is proposed which works for generic state channels [29] . In PISA, the third party (named as a custodian) appointed by customers to watch the state channel and cancel execution forks only needs to store the hash of the most recent state, and thus only O(1) storage is required. Moreover, PISA provides publicly verifiable cryptographic evidence in case the custodian fails, based on which the involved customer is able to penalize the custodian. However, the customer of custodian is implicit to the public and the custodian can use the same deposit as a safety for all customers.
The always-online assumption is moved in PISA from parties to a custodian and moreover the system is not designed in a failsafe way -i.e., an unavailable/failed custodian silently accepts malicious disputes, thus to mitigate it payout timeouts should be set long enough, freezing deposits of parties.
The Disclose Cascade Watch Commit (DCWC) scheme [7] proposes to incentivize multiple third parties to provide watching services, where only watchtowers whose participating evidences are included on chain get paid. However, each party has to be responsive and synchronized with the blockchain at all times. While DCWC relates to node failures as well, security in general and topology-based attacks in particular have been mostly neglected, though.
Watching Services and Trust. Although it may be counterintuitive that parties of a decentralized platform employ a centralized entity (i.e., a watchtower) for dispute resolution, there are essential differences between these approaches and the centralization of the underlying blockchain platform. First of all, watching services (as well as payment channels and other upper-layer applications) are external to the platform and its consensus rules, therefore they do not violate the decentralization of the platform itself. Second, the trust placed in watching services is "local" to the parties that deploy it, i.e., no other blockchain participants have to trust (or even be aware of) such a service. Moreover, some designs (including ours) allow a client to be represented by a watching service in a way opaque even to the peer of the payment channel. Finally, designs of watching services can benefit from the properties of the underlying platforms, which include transparency of service actions (allowing early detection of misbehavior) or cryptoeconomic incentives aiming to facilitate correct service behavior by punishments and rewards.
PRELIMINARIES 3.1 Blockchain and Smart Contract
Over the last decade, the blockchain technology has been pioneered by Bitcoin [11] which enables mutually untrusted parties to reach consensus over the state of a distributed and decentralized global ledger confirming and serializing "transactions". By using a similar consensus protocol and extending the scripting language of Bitcoin to a Turing complete programming language, Ethereum [1] was built -a general-purpose blockchain system with its native cryptocurrency ether which can execute programs over a decentralized and replicated state machine named as the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Due to the Turing completeness, with Ethereum one can implement self-enforcing programs called smart contracts with nearly arbitrary business logic.
To prevent parties from intentionally or unintentionally abusing the system resources, computation and memory utilization in Ethereum are charged in gas which can be purchased with ether with certain exchange rate. Therefore, maintaining a smart contract storing data objects of large size and performing complex computations can be very expensive. To facilitate lightweight communication between smart contracts and deploying them clients, a mechanism of events and logs is introduced in Ethereum. Smart contracts can emit events and write logs to the blockchain. When they are called, the emitted messages are stored in the transaction's log associated with the address of the contract. Log and event data are not accessible from within contracts but can be captured by clients reading (part of) the blockchain.
Payment Channels
A payment channel is a relationship established between two participants that wish to transact, such that bi-directional payments can be made by exchanging off-chain messages if both parties behave honestly. The state of the relationship resulted from those off-chain transactions will eventually be recorded on blockchain, which only happens when the payment channel is finalized. A set of rules are enforced by the blockchain to guarantee that the channel is finalized with the correct state even if all parties are malicious. The life cycle of a payment channel can be divided into the following phases.
Setup. Before the payment channel is established, the involved parties need to deposit certain amount of coins to a payment channel contract that both parties agree on. These coins are going to be redistributed continuously among them during the payment phase.
Payment. During this phase the participants of the channel can make an arbitrary number of payments (within the channel capacity induced by the initial deposit) to each other by exchanging jointly signed off-chain messages. Since there is no interaction with the blockchain, the transaction throughput is only limited by computing resources and the actual communication network for exchanging messages between the parties, effectively bypassing the bottleneck due to the underlying consensus mechanism of the blockchain.
Closure. Any party can try to close the payment channel by issuing a state signed by both parties to the blockchain. Before the channel is finalized with this submitted state, the payment channel reserves a time window for the other party to intervene and invalidate the previously submitted state with a newer signed state. Eventually, the most recent state seen by the blockchain will be accepted after a timeout. According to this rule, the payment channel may end up with a non-latest state against the legitimate interest of one side who fails to provide proper evidence to the payment channel contract showing the invalidity of the previously submitted state within the time window. Therefore, it is essential to observe the blockchain constantly to ensure that only the latest state will be accepted by the blockchain.
FAIL-SAFE WATCHTOWERS 4.1 Overview
Before proceeding with the details, we give a brief overview of our design, which is depicted in Figure 1 . Two participants first register with a payment channel contract by depositing some initial funds there. Then, through the tower contract they can employ a third party called a watchtower to protect the payment state of their own channel. Afterwards, the registered channel participants communicate off-chain to authorize and make payments with each other, redistributing the initial deposits amongst themselves. To keep track of the transactions, a monotonic transaction counter is incremented for every transaction appearing in the channel. The watchtower receives and verifies every off-chain transaction, and records the latest state of the payment channel. A watchtower can monitor the off-chain states of multiple channels simultaneously. It manages a tower contract and periodically updates it with the so-called confirmation set which is used to determine payout process. To close the channel, a party submits a closure transaction to the channel contract which delegates the final payout decision to the tower contract. Any participant is able to invoke dispute if any disagreement happens.
We design protocol with the following goals in mind:
Security. We assume an adversary who cannot compromise • the underlying cryptographic primitives (e.g., digital signatures, hash functions, etc.), • the properties of the underlying blockchain platform, • the smart contract runtime environment, • a watchtower (but an adversary can be one peer of the payment channel); however, we discuss some cases of misbehaving watchtowers. Under these assumptions our watchtower protocol should prevent unregistered parties from bypassing identity authorization. In particular, any unauthorized party should not be allowed to trigger channel closure and the potential dispute processes. Moreover, any unauthorized payment state should not be verified by a channel contract successfully. In addition, we aim the watchtower service to be fail-safe, i.e., an unavailable watchtower (e.g., attacked via a (D)DoS) should not silently accept channel closures and its default behavior should be rejective (in practice, a long timeout should be triggered in that case as otherwise parties would not recover from an unavailable watchtower).
Efficiency and Low Cost. Our protocol should operate as efficiently as possible. There should be no efficiency bottlenecks with respect to throughput, storage, latency, etc. which could hinder its applicability in real-world scenarios. Moreover, the cost of applying proposed solutions in terms of storage, computation, and blockchain-related fees should be minimized. Scalability. Watchtowers should be able to handle a large number of payment channels and the overheads introduced should not increase significantly with the increasing number of channels and transactions.
Privacy. Transaction details should be known only to transacting parties. In particular, watchtowers should not learn transactions or their patterns while protecting the channel. We emphasize, that in the case of dispute or channel closure, privacy of these "closing" transactions may not be achieved as these actions are conducted over a publicly readable blockchain.
Accountability. Watchtowers should fulfill duties once received payment from parties. In particular, employed watchtowers should collect messages and record the latest state for a given channel. They also need to deal with closure events, resolve potential dispute, and proceed payout in time. Otherwise, an honest party should always be able to prove the wrongdoing of a watchtower and withdraw payment.
In the following sections, we will introduce the details and interactions of our protocol.
Channel Setup
We assume two mutually untrusting parties, Alice and Bob, that wish to establish and use a bidirectional payment channel. To this end, one of them has to deploy a payment channel contract on the blockchain as shown in Algorithm 1. Afterwards, the unique address cid of this payment channel contract is used to reference the payment channel. The life cycle of the channel contract can be divided into three phases (⊥, OK, and DISPUTE), which is indicated by a global flag of the contract.
Alice and Bob then register their public keys (pk A , pk B ) and deposit coins into the contract for their subsequent transactions within the channel. To achieve this, one party (say Alice) is responsible for initializing channel using the setup() method. Before the actual setup, she is supposed to receive a signature from the counter-party (say Bob) where the signed message is the initial state (s 0 ) between parties and the bal A in s 0 represents the amount Alice is depositing. Then, she deposits bal A and assigns a watchtower by providing the address of a watchtower contract. This watchtower contract is maintained by a third party who will be employed to monitor the channel and prevent it from finalizing with outdated states. The flag transitions from ⊥ to OK. Afterwards, Bob also needs to get the signature from Alice that signs a new exchange state (s 1 ) and then he freezes bal B in s 1 via the deposit() method shown in Algorithm 1. These atomic exchanges enjoy two advantages: 1) ensures the amount deposited by each party is signed and agreed by the counter-party, 2) avoids clash behavior from any party (in the case of failed setup any party can get its deposit back). For an honest party, we allow her to get coins back via directly invoking close request and inputting signed state.
Watchtower Employment
Before Alice and Bob can securely make off-chain transactions via the payment channel, they need to employ a watchtower to monitor the channel. One of the participants pays the watching service via a watchtower contract shown in Algorithm 2.
Although, watchtowers can be introduced to a channel in many ways, for a simple description we assume that Bob first deposits amount in the tower contract and then sends a signature with cid to the watchtower which verifies the authenticity of the payment by simply checking if Bob deposits the correct amount. As a result, the payment channel with cid is protected by the watchtower. A watchtower is considered trusted, however, a customer (i.e., a party) should be able to withdraw amount if he proves watchtower is wrongdoing or not fulfilling eligible job. To successfully withdraw a deposit, a customer should submit a challenge via the channel contract that proves the watchtower did not either close the given channel with the latest state or respond to the channel contract in time. We employ a tolerance timeout t motivating the watchtower to respond faster and more efficiently. The watchtower will not lose anything if it replies to the channel contract before t.
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Figure 2: Payment Exchange
Otherwise, a longer timeout T is initialized and a linear rewarding would be triggered. This mechanism rewards the watchtower inversely proportional to the watchtower's response time. It prevents unavailable or failed watchtowers from getting undeserved fees and incentivizes watchtowers to maintain high availability and to shorten timeouts.
Regular Payment
After a watchtower is employed, Alice and Bob are ready to make off-chain transactions via the payment channel by participating in an interactive protocol depicted in Figure 2 .
As in [14] , the payment channel is modeled as a state machine, and the state transitions from s i to s i+1 are carried out by offchain transactions signed by both Alice and Bob. We encode each state s i as a tuple (bal A , bal B , idx), where bal A and bal B are the corresponding balances of Alice and Bob within the channel, and idx is a monotonic index starting from 0, which is incremented for every state transition and the state with the largest idx is considered the latest state.
To make a new transaction, Alice computes the hash value h s i = H(s i ∥ r ) with recalculated balances (bal A , bal B ) and incremented idx, where r is a large (e.g., 256-bit) random number. Then she sends the signature 
Watchtower Contract Management
Tower contracts are deployed and managed by watchtowers. A tower contract (see Algorithm 2) maintains two mapping (or dictionary) data structures: Balances, Channels, and a bitmap structure confirmation set (Confs).
Items in Balances can be referenced by Balances[cid], where cid is the address of a channel contract. There are two fields for each item and they can be accessed via Balances[cid].customer and Balances[cid].deposit, which record the account (public key) of an external owned account and its deposit respectively.
The data structure Channels with integer keys stores tuples < cidArray[], stateArray[] > whose entries are two arrays, where stateArray[i] is supposed to keep track of the state of the channel contract with address (or cid) cidArray[i].
Confs stores a bit-vector (or a bitmap) whose jth bit indicates whether the channel with address Channels[k].cidArray[j] is allowed to be closed, where k is an update counter. Such a decision is encoded via a single bit only. The Confs data structure is periodically updated by a watchtower. A rational watchtower wishing to maximize its profit is expected to respond to a channel contract before a tolerance timeout t as otherwise its fee will decrease linearly with the response delay. Since a single watchtower can be employed by multiple channels, during each update period, a watchtower is expected to capture multiple channel-closing transactions through the closure events emitted by the channel contracts, containing the values of cid, s i , and a random number r , which are necessary for the watchtower to verify the validity of the intended closing state.
Let us assume that during the update period, the watchtower captures a sequence of closure events for channels with addresses
For each channel, the watchtower extracts relevant information from the corresponding event and checks whether the closing state s i is compatible with its local record of the latest state of the channel. As a result, a confirmation set
and only if cid j is allowed to be closed. Then the watchtower updates Confs in the tower contract by calling its update() method with the newly constructed confirmation set. This triggers the respond() method which in turn invokes the payout() method of the channel contract.
Payment Closure
Any payment channel participant who wants to finalize the channel with a specific state s i can initiate the channel closure process by invoking the close() method of the channel contract presented in Algorithm 1. After successfully verifying the supplied signatures together with the associated state s i and the random number r , the channel contract changes its flag to DISPUTE and sets a tolerance timeout t from now on. Afterwards, the close() method of the watchtower contract can be called with the state s i . Then the watchtower contract updates the mapping data structure (Channels) by placing the cid and the state s i into cidArray and stateArray or only updating stateArray when cid already exists in the cidArray (see line 15 -line 21 of Algorithm 2).
The interaction between the channel contract and the tower contract is finished when the watchtower calls its update() method to update the confirmation set structure. Then, the update() method invokes the respond() method of the tower contract to determine which channels are allowed to close according to values in Confs. The respond() method will call the payout() method of all channels appearing in the Channels data structure with the decisions on if they are allowed to be closed.
To illustrate different cases of this process, we show an example scenario, where we assume that Alice and Bob have exchanged three payment tuples:
T 1 : (10, 0, 0),T 2 : (7, 3, 1),T 3 : (4, 6, 2).
As depicted in Figure 3 , Alice closes cid i with T 3 . Once noticed, a tolerance timeout t (e.g., one hour) would be triggered in the channel contract that allows the tower contract to confirm the submitted state and to proceed payout and consequently close the channel. The tower contract replies to the channel contract based on a confirmation set updated by the watchtower periodically. In particular, cid i would be allowed to close only if the corresponding index is set to 1 in the confirmation set. An alternative case is when Alice wants to misbehave by submitting the stale state of T 2 and potentially benefiting due to her higher balance. Therefore, she invokes a new close event passing T 2 as the current state. However, in such a case, an honest watchtower would deny the closure request since T 2 is a stale state. Therefore, the watchtower sets 0 in the corresponding position of the confirmation set for cid i . Once disallowed, a longer and fail-safe timeout T (T ≫ t, e.g., a day or two) is initialized that ensures that the deposit will not be paid out if any misbehavior happened. A similar situation will happen when the watchtower does not respond on time and T is also initialized. We assume that parties can connect to the blockchain at least once per T, thus Bob would notice the misbehavior performed by Alice. Then Bob commits a dispute transaction with T 3 as an input , aiming to prove that T 2 is an older off-chain payment state. In such a case, the watchtower would resolve the potential dispute and close the channel faster, namely, before T. Otherwise, payout will be proceeded by any party after T units of time.
By this design, our construction minimizes waiting times and achieves fail-safe, as in common case a watchtower would confirm payouts quickly. Meanwhile, the long timeout T prevents any misbehavior from parties or unavailability and wrongdoings from the watchtower but without additional storage overhead introduced compared with existing watching service schemes. Moreover, the watchtower can minimize costs confirming multiple pending channel closure requests only with sending a single blockchain message.
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
To evaluate our design, we implemented the payment channel contract and the tower contract using the Solidity programming language (compiler version 0.4.24) and we deployed our scheme on an Ethereum testnet. The off-chain watchtower and two parties, Alice and Bob, are implemented as a web server running Node.js v10.2.1 bundled with the node-localStorage package for storing cid, s i , Hs, and signatures. We employ web3.js 2 to interact with deployed smart contracts. We use the Ethereum's ECDSA signature scheme as the default one, as Ethereum provides a native and optimized support for it. 
Cost
In our protocol, to invoke the closure procedure, a party sends a transaction with a proper state s i which is verified first by the channel contract, then the watchtower interacts with the tower contract which handles the closure event. The main cost is introduced due to the computation and storage whose utilization is charged by the Ethereum network. We perform a series of experiments to measure the cost in terms of gas consumption and its corresponding monetary cost.
Closure. We conduct experiments for a different number of channel closure requests, measure their gas cost and present the results, together with the cost converted to US dollars 3 , in Table 1 .
We measure the cost of a channel closure for a different number of requests, i.e., 10 i (0 ≤ i ≤ 3) requests. Conservatively, we assume that all the closure requests are submitted during the t-long time period (i.e., all these requests will be processed using a single confirmation set). From Table 1 , we can see that the dominating operation cost is due to the storage required for cid addresses and states s i . The cost also slightly decreases with the number of closure requests due to data structure initialization cost that is paid upfront when initializing a tower contract. Similarly, the cost of updating a confirmation set also shows a decreasing trend per request since a watchtower updates it in batches periodically. The more closure events happen in t period the less each channel has to pay due to they share equally. Therefore, as depicted the concept of fail-safe watchtowers is cost-effective for handling a large number of channels. The payout procedure is the final step of the whole closure process which has a stable cost with the channel number scaled. The overall cost of each channel closure request is around $0.14.
Dispute. As discussed in Section 4.6, our design allows any party to invoke a potential dispute process. The gas cost of the dispute process is similar, despite additional verification operations are required on the channel contract side. We conduct the analogical experiments as in the previous case and the results are shown in Table 2 . To successfully invoke a dispute, a party needs to submit a newer signed and valid state s i . The channel contract also checks if current time is illegal before verifying the flag and validation of s i ). From Table 2 , we can see that the most common closure case still dominates the main cost within the dispute operation but the entire cost is reasonably low at $0.183.
Confirmation Set. As discussed in Section 4.6, a watchtower sends a single message to the blockchain network, creates an updated confirmation set periodically which requires to be stored on the channel contracts side. The size (and consequently the cost) of this storage depends on the number of channel-closing requests. To give insights on the cost, we measure the cost of updating a confirmation set for the number of 10 i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) channels and present the obtained results in Table 3 . As shown, the cost for the confirmation set update operation with a small number of channels increases slightly. With the number of channels growing, our protocol shows a good characteristics where the only cost is around $0.1 for 10 3 channels per update transaction. Such a low cost is achieved mainly by encoding every channel closure by only a single bit. 
Throughput
We evaluate the watchtower throughput running an instance on a system with macOS Sierra 10.12.6, Intel Core i5 CPU (2.7 GHz), and 8GB of RAM. We create 10 i (0 ≤ i ≤ 4) off-chain transactions between parties, each of them exchanges a state with a watchtower, then we measure the total time needed by the watchtower to handle the exchange steps, and compute the average time required per transaction. The obtained results are summarized in Figure 4 , where we can see that the number of off-chain transactions handled per second raises when requests are processed in batches. The throughput becomes stable when the number of requests is greater than 10 4 , with the total time cost around 3.95ms per off-chain exchange.
Efficiency Comparison
In this section, we compare Lightning Channels, Duplex micropayment channels, Raiden, PISA, and our work. All comparisons are based on the protocol descriptions presented in the context of Section 2. We focus on the number of signatures/transactions 
Cost
Stage
Setup Payment Dispute
Duplex [12] (d + 2) × 2 1 1 × 2 Lightning [35] 2 × 2 1 × 2 ≥ 3 Raiden [4] 2 1 ≥ 2 PISA [29] 1 + 2 3 ≥ 3 Our work 2 3 2 required for each step in the above protocols and the corresponding cost incurred.
Signatures and Transactions. Table 4 highlights the number of signatures required for each stage of Duplex [12] , Lightning [35] , Raiden [4], PISA [29] , and our work. Next, we provide a comparison on the number of signatures and transactions that are required for each stage of the protocols. For the fairness of the comparison, we assume that only two participants are involved in all protocols.
Lightning and Duplex require both participants to sign the channel's state first, before cooperatively signing a so-called Funding Transaction. The state in Lightning is simply a pair of commitment transactions, thus there should be 2×2 transactions required in total. While in Duplex the state is the first branch of an invalidation tree which consists of d nodes and two unidirectional channels. In Raiden and our work, the channel setup stage requires one party to sign a transaction to establish the channel with deposit. The counter-party can sign another transaction that aims to deposit coins and register identity by himself only. To initialize a channel in PISA, a customer invokes a setup transaction with registering two parties each of whom will respectively deposit coins afterwards.
As for the payment stage, Raiden and Duplex are used for a pair of unidirectional channels which require a single signature generated from a party to perform a newer payment. The current balance of both parties should be maintained in Lightning. To update their own balances and send an off-chain payment, both customers need to sign a new transaction. Payment exchange in PISA requires one party to separately sign a command message and new state i . Both signatures σ cmd k and σ st at e k are sent to a counter-party who responds with a new agreed σ then. In our work, three signatures are required for every payment, including two from the transacting parties and another one created by the watchtower. Our work shows a good performance in the case of a dispute. Lightning requires the disputer to send commitment transaction first which is followed by two transactions where each party claims its final balance and all unlocked conditional transfers. In some cases, the conditional transfers can be associated with multiple lock times. Therefore, an additional transaction to claim each conditional transfer would be incurred which requires ≥3 transactions in total. In Duplex, both parties must sign the states of the unidirectional channels that represent their latest payment from the counter-party and send both transactions to the blockchain. Similarly, each party in Raiden sends the same two transactions to the network as in Duplex. However, each conditional transfer that needs to be unlocked requires the receiver to sign an additional transaction to claim it, which takes ≥2 transactions to settle the dispute. When a dispute occurs in PISA, any party within the channel can enforce an on-chain state transition via the dispute process. First, one party updates the state via setState then initiates the dispute using trig-gerDispute. Moreover, PISA allows all parties to input a command cmd to be considered for the state transition which requires ≥3 transactions in aggregate. In our protocol, one party signs a single transaction to enforce a dispute. The channel will wait for a decision from the tower contract managed by the watchtower who sends another single message to resolve the dispute.
Cost. To further compare our scheme with the most related work, we conducted experiments using the PISA implementation. Table 5 presents the detailed cost comparison of our protocol and PISA [29] . The result shows that one-time deployment cost of our channel contract is lower than that of PISA since we remove the state transition and input methods, and instead employ a tower contract to handle closure and resolve dispute procedures. A watchtower periodically sends single message into tower contract where only lightweight data structures are deployed to store cid and s i .
It is also cost-effective compared with sophisticated logic of the PISA's custodian contract. In the channel setup phase, our protocol needs to store one more information (the address of the watchtower) while only public keys of both parties are saved in PISA. The cost of the channel setup is slightly higher than in PISA but the difference is not significant. Both, our work and PISA allow withdrawing deposited amount if parties are able to prove a watching service's wrongdoing. A customer in PISA first seeks recourse then invokes the refund process but the cost of these operations is similar in both protocols. When a dispute happens in PISA, one party first sets collectively authorized state (setstate) then initiates dispute process via triggerdispute. Afterwards, the party submits command list (input) and eventually a state transition is executed on-chain under the aid of custodian contract. Our work requires one party to enforce dispute that proves the newer payment state has been performed off-chain then employ tower contract to resolve. The total cost is still lower than PISA. In conclusion, our work can be regarded as more cost-effective.
Payout
Timeouts. An important advantage of our design is that in the common case (i.e., parties are honest and a watchtower is available) the channel can be closed quickly. To confirm it empirically, we conducted an experiment to measure a time delay required to close a channel. In our experiment the channel closures and the corresponding payouts became part of the blockchain just after one or two blocks (i.e., between 14-28 seconds on average), which is significantly faster than in systems which silently accept closures after a timeout. For instance, the timeouts in Raiden refer to the number of blocks that are required to be mined from the time that close() is called until the channel can be settled with a call to settle() and its value is set by default to 50. With block arrival times of Ethereum (14 seconds on average [5] ) the required time in Raiden is around 12 minutes. We emphasize, that usually it is a parameter that parties can adjust; however, in the previous designs it also constitutes the tolerable unavailability of watching services (thus, too short timeout may cause the service ineffective).
Deployment Considerations
Scalability. For simplicity and an intuitive description, we only give an example in the context of bidirectional payment channels but our protocol can be easily extended to multiple payment channels and many users. To support channels with more than two users, the off-chain exchange (see Section 4.4) would be scaled without much more cost incurred as the signature verification and communication expense are relatively cheap. Moreover, watchtowers can easily scale to handle a large number of channels and the confirmation set is easy to update and scale as well without increasing overhead drastically. In practice, watchtowers can be realized without incurring significant overheads and costs since they can be implemented as light blockchain clients. To have a concrete perspective on the cost, we measure the communication and storage overhead for watchtower deployment. As depicted in Figure 5 , the data layout exchanged from parties to watchtower (P → W T ) for each off-chain exchange is an 198-bytes object, where cid indicates the observed channel address, H s encodes the hashed state value, idx specifies the transaction index, σ A and σ B are the signatures from both parties. Meanwhile, the results for the communication cost from watchtower to parties (WT → P) and between parties (P ⇔ P) are shown in Table 6 . Moreover, we measure the storage cost of storing the latest state value for 10 i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) channels. From Table 6 , we can see that it takes only 12MB for a watchtower to observe 10 3 channels.
198 bytes Figure 5 : The layout of data from party to watchtower.
Incentives. The linear rewarding mechanism (see Section 4.3) motivates watchtowers to maintain high availability and to shorten payout timeouts. A mechanism punishing unavailable or failed watchtowers is also implemented in our system where customers submit the ineligibility proofs to the channel contract (see Algorithm 1) and eventually withdraw their deposit. There are various options for parties to employ a watchtower according to their performance and commission, which in turn incentivizes watchtowers to participant our system and provide better services.
SECURITY DISCUSSION
First, we show that all successfully verifiable messages created within our protocol are authentic. As we assume that any party cannot obtain a valid secret key of its counter-party (see Section 4.1), a malicious party cannot generate and sign a payment state on behalf of honest parties. This implies that the newer states are agreed by all parties in our protocol. All channel closure, and optionally dispute, transactions require states verification process first (see in Section 4.6) which ensures that a state submitted by parties is authentic (i.e., signed by all participants). The only way to obtain such a state is to be signed and exchanged by both parties within payment channels.
Next, we formalize our system by the following definitions and we show its main security properties. Definition 1. By definition, the protocol Π(P, W, A, ϕ, φ) is a dynamic process with five components involved, where P denotes the compliance parties in the payment channel, W represents the watchtowers entities, A is a potential adversary, and ϕ and φ specify the payment channel contract and the tower contract, respectively.
Definition 2. Let C = {online,offline} be a set of availability states for the compliance parties and watchtowers (please note that we consider a successful (D)DoS attack as the offline state). Then the function 0/1 ← F secur e (P C , W C , A, state i , σ st at e ) is triggered before the protocol Π(P, W, A, ϕ, φ) is finalized with state i . P C and W C reveal the availability state of the honest parties and watchtowers, state i denotes an off-chain payment transaction submitted by any party while σ st at e is the corresponding signature. The output 1 means that the state i is the latest off-chain payment state and the final payout should be performed, while 0 indicates that there are suspicious misbehavior (e.g., an illegitimate dispute) and additional actions should be performed to prevent the system from going into an insecure state.
Observation 1. The channel is allowed to close with a correct state submitted by honest P.
Proof. When the parties registered in the channel agree to close the channel with state i , P sends a closure transaction to ϕ and then the function F secur e (P online , W online , A, state i , σ st at e i ) is executed and returns 1. Afterwards, W checks the output of F secur e , updates Confs with φ and confirms the final payout with ϕ. □ Observation 2. If A plays a strategy that finalizes the payment channel with a stale state submitted when the counter-party P is in the offline state (e.g., temporarily away or (D)DoSed), then A cannot gain any unearned income from the channel.
Proof. We assume that A invokes a closure transaction by submitting the stale state state i . Before finalizing the channel, the function F secur e (P of f line , W online , A, state i , σ st at e i ) outputs 0 since an eligible watchtower rejects the state which is not the latest one. Then the long timeout T is initialized. In Section 4.6, we assume that parties can connect to the blockchain at least once per T, thus when P become available it would notice the misbehavior performed by A. Then P sends the dispute transaction into ϕ with the latest signed off-chain payment state. Eventually, W resolves the dispute and the payment channel finalizes with a correct state. □ Observation 3. If W is unavailable (i.e., offline for a while or under a (D)DoS attack launched by A), the protocol Π(P, W, A, ϕ, φ) goes into a fail-safe state and the channel is still able to be finalized with a correct state.
Proof. The Observation 3 has two implications. First, when W is offline for a while and becomes inaccessible, the function 0 ← F secur e (P online , W of f line , A, state i , σ st at e i ) as it cannot interact with φ on time. Then a long timeout T is triggered. In this period, the channel participant P submits a dispute transactions into the blockchain. Afterwards, W is responsible for resolving the dispute and closing the channel. Second, a similar situation happens even when W undergoes a (D)DoS attack and becomes unavailable, in the period of T , P performs dispute and ϕ records the latest off-chain state. After T , the final payout would be proceeded by any party with the correct state. □ MITM Attack or Substitution Attack. To launch a MITM attack, A can eavesdrop and intercept transactions from W to φ and P to ϕ. For instance, he extracts the Confs and s i respectively, then constructs new transactions with the intercepted data. However, as shown at the beginning of this section, the malicious transactions cannot pass the verification procedures on ϕ and φ's side since A cannot compromise the underlying cryptographic primitives or pretend to be the other parties. Any tiny change of the context (i.e., s i ) will be caught by the signature verification process. Moreover, other eavesdropping or MITM attacks can be easily mitigated by deploying an end-to-end authenticated and encrypted communication channel between the protocol parties.
Failure safety. The concept of fail-safe watchtowers ensures that honest parties are able to close channels with a quick timeout in most generic cases. However, when an adversary is intentionally closing a channel with a stale state, a longer but safe-assurance timeout is introduced. This long timeout avoids wrongdoing or unavailability of watchtowers. In particular, any unavailable or compromised watchtower should not accept channel closures in silence. In contrast to competing systems, this design introduces longer timeouts only for the worst-case (i.e., a misbehaving peer), while in the common case (i.e., honest peers and an available watchtower) channels are closed quickly and safe.
State privacy. Our protocol provides the so-called state privacy as proposed in [29] , which is an extension of the notion of value privacy [28] . Unless the details of the state are revealed by the channel participants in order to finalize the channel, a watchtower only learns the hash value H(s i ∥ r ). Therefore, the metadata of all intermediate states are invisible to the watchtower, thus the privacy of the off-chain transactions is protected. Note that the hash value is computed with a large random number r , which prevents a watchtower from finding the pre-image by exhausting s i , whose entropy can be fairly low.
Availability. Requiring watchtowers to keep off-chain verified states and updating confirmation sets introduces a single point of failure, as with a failed (or (D)DoSed) watchtower it would not be possible to respond to a channel closure request. Fortunately, as discussed, in this case a longer timeout will be triggered. Moreover, a watchtower instance can be easily replicated by replicas running a traditional distributed consensus protocol to share current channel states.
SHORT-LIVED ASSERTIONS 7.1 Motivation
Although watchtowers increase the security of payment channels, in small-amount (micro)payment scenarios their deployment may be economically inefficient. Traditional bank-based transactions usually incur between 21 to 25 cents (in the US) fees [32] plus a percentage of the transaction amount. To better understand fee structures in blockchain platform, we investigated them for Ethereum and Bitcoin. For example, a plain transaction in Ethereum (without executing smart contracts) currently costs around $0.011 4 and similarly in Bitcoin transaction fees are usually at least 0.0001 BTC [32] , 4 The estimation is from https://ethgasstation.info/ corresponding to between 2.5 and 10 cents over the last five years. As depicted in Figure 6 (a) and Figure 6 (d) the average transaction fees of Bitcoin decreased to around $0.5 in recent six months while staying around $0.1 in Ethereum. Meanwhile, Figure 6 (b) shows a vivid insight that most transactions fees in Bitcoin stand between $0.025 and $0.125.
The concept of watchtowers may be economically viable for most generic payment cases which can achieve quick channel termination. However, customers in such scenarios like online gaming, video streaming, or energy markets [3], should perform transactions almost continuously with tiny amounts. In Figure 6 (c) and Figure 6 (e), we show that for the Ethereum platform, the median transaction value transferred in recent half-year is less than $0.15. Therefore, small payments are still dominating the majority of all transactions in Ethereum.
Although, it is hard to estimate the transaction distribution in payment channels (as this data is not public) we can assure a lower bound for a watchtower profitability. We set Γ to denote the cost of renting a watchtower and Σtx represents the total expense of a blockchain transaction in a channel. The value of Σtx includes the value transferred and transaction fees incurred. When parties perform tiny-amount transactions, i.e., when
Σtx < Γ it means that the cost of the watchtower involved is higher than the cost the contract termination by itself. Therefore, employing a watchtower in such a case is economically ineffective.
To mitigate this limitation, we introduce short-lived assertions that allow channel contracts to distinguish out-of-date and relatively fresh payment states without relying on any other third party.
Mechanism
A generic limitation of existing payment channels is that smart contracts operating them cannot distinguish whether a given statement is the latest one, as an on-chain smart contract does not know an off-chain state without being updated (payment channels exactly want to limit on-chain updates). As a consequence, a stale signed assertion can be sent to a contract which without knowing about its freshness would temporarily accept it as the current one. To mitigate this issue, we introduce short-lived assertions that allow a channel contract to distinguish a fresh state from old ones, and possibly close the channel with a fresh state quicker.
We assume that [PAY k −1 , PAY k +1 ] are off-chain transactions between Alice and Bob conducted just after arrival of blocks block i−1 and block i+1 respectively as depicted in Figure 7 . In our construction, each party appends a block hash value when exchanging a newer micropayment state, such that a state is extended by a block hash value which acts as a freshness information (i.e., it implies that the transaction is newer than the given block). For instance, PAY k −1 would be generated as:
where H (block i−1 ) represents the hash value of the current block.
As our main goal is to eliminate any third party, like a watchtower, channel contracts should be able to distinguish by themselves a possibly stale state from relatively fresh states. Interestingly, that can be simply realized, as smart contract languages allow contracts to access recent block hashes, therefore, a channel contract can verify that the given state is fresh by verifying it against n last recent block hashes (where n can be a contract-specific parameter). If such a state is submitted it implies that it was created recently, thus the channel contract can be closed faster as a) it is likely that the state is quite accurate, thus even if one party successfully misbehaves, its benefit will be relatively small or marginal, b) it is likely that the both parties are still online, thus any party can mitigate potential misbehavior. If the channel contract receives a state which is stale (i.e., older than n last blocks), then it triggers a dispute with a long timeout T . Short-lived assertion is a complementary solution that can be applicable for circumstances in which watchtowers are economically unjustified. We believe that it may be especially interesting in applications like micro-or nanopayments. Another interesting property of this solution is that it ensures both parties that they see the same version of the blockchain (they sign the same recent block hash with every transaction), thus it can additionally protect them from some blockchain-fork related attacks. 
Evaluation
In the design of short-lived assertions, each off-chain transactions is associated with the current block hash value. A channel contract customizes a freshness limit n to determine whether the statement is relatively fresh or not via simply checking how old is the block hash from the statement. The cost incurred depends on the size of the freshness limit and the statement submitted. The larger the limit is set, the more gas would be spent as more checks need to proceed in the worst case. We measure the total cost of short-lived assertions verification (including state parsing, state verification, and block hash value freshness verification) for the limit values set to 2 × i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) blocks, and describe the data in Table 7 . Please note that the cost results come from the worst case execution for every different freshness limit, which means that the channel contract should verify the freshness check of the block hash value for all blocks within limit. As shown in Table 7 , the total cost for short-lived assertions with the limit set to two blocks is $0.05. With the freshness limit increasing, more block hash evaluations are processed thus the cost increases as well.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose novel fail-safe watchtowers that do not constantly watch on-chain payment channel contracts but watch off-chain transactions and only send a single on-chain message periodically. We show that our watchtowers are fail-safe and efficient, easily handling thousands of payment channels. Our design minimizes timeouts required in the common case, as a watchtower can immediately confirm a channel closure without waiting for a long timeout. Moreover, we show that watchtowers in general may be economically ineffective in terms of micropayments and multiple payment scenarios. We introduce short-lived assertions that allow channel contracts to distinguish fresh and stale assertions and process channel closures accordingly. Combinations and extensions of these frameworks can be an interesting future research topic. In particular, we would like to investigate fail-safe watchtowers publishing current channel states with a randomized probabilistic set implementations (like Bloom filters) instead of a bitmap like presented.
